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UNTANGLING ENTANGLEMENT 
STEPHANIE H. BARCLAY* 
ABSTRACT 
The Court has increasingly signaled its interest in taking a more 
historical approach to the Establishment Clause. And in its recent American 
Legion decision, the Supreme Court strongly suggested that the three-prong 
Lemon test is essentially dead letter. Such a result would make sense for the 
first two prongs of the Lemon test about secular purpose and the effects. 
Many scholars have observed that these aspects of the prong are judicial 
creations far afield of the Establishment Clause history. But what of the 
entanglement prong of the test? If we rejected all applications of this prong 
of the analysis, would we be essentially throwing the baby out with the 
bathwater? This Article cautions that this might be the case. 
A close analysis of the Court's entanglement jurisprudence, compared 
against historical support for the various applications, suggests that 
entanglement jurisprudence ought to remain good law in at least two 
contexts. First, where it has protected religious groups from government 
interference with the autonomy, internal affairs, and administration. 
Second, where it prevents government from treating certain religious 
groups in a preferential way, including by granting monopoly power in the 
performance of public functions. On the other hand, the Court's 
entanglement precedent is on far shakier historical ground in several 
contexts, including anti-sectarian skepticism of any sort of government aid 
to religious groups (and accompanying monitoring requirements to avoid 
religious use of funds), concerns about political divisiveness when 
government interacts with religious groups, and opposition to government 
classifications necessary to provide religious exemptions. If the Court were 
to modify its entanglement analysis to disregard ahistorical applications 
and embrace the historical ones, the upshot would be far less apparent 
tension between the Religion Clauses. Such an interpretation could 
facilitate an increase in religious pluralism and human flourishing and a 
decrease in unnecessary cultural fights aimed at excluding religion.from the 
public sphere. 
• Associate Professor of Law at Notre Dame Law School. For helpful comments, the author 
thanks Ashutosh Bhagwat, Marc DeGirolami, Chad Flanders, Richard Garnett, Gabrielle Girgis, Luke 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of the Supreme Court's recent decision in American Legion, 1 
scholars have begun to debate the fate of the infamous Lemon2 test. Six of 
the justices in American Legion seem to be in favor of rejecting the Lemon 
test to some extent. Justice Alita (joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice 
Breyer, Justice Kagan, and Justice Kavanaugh) criticized Lemon in the 
context of symbol cases,3 Justice Kavanaugh stated that "[American Legion] 
again makes clear that the Lemon test does not apply to Establishment 
Clause cases, "4 Justice Gorsuch suggested that Lemon is effectively 
"shelved,"5 and Justice Thomas went as far as to say that the Court should 
"overrule the Lemon test in all contexts."6 Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh 
argued that Lemon should no longer be good law, 7 and Justice Thomas 
favored expressly overruling Lemon. 8 A plurality opinion observed that the 
I. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass'n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019). 
2. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
3. Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2085 (longstanding religious displays have a "strong presumption 
of constitutionality"); id. at 2084-85 ("A government that roams the land, tearing down monuments with 
religious symbolism and scrubbing away any reference to the divine will strike many as aggressively 
hostile to religion."). 
4. Id. at 2093 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
5. Id. at 2102 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
6. Id. at 2097 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
7. Id. at 2093 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); id. at 2101 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
8. Id. at 2097 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
2020] UNTANGLING ENTANGLEMENT 1703 
Lemon Court's "ambitious[] attempt[] to find a grand unified theory of the 
Establishment Clause" has given way to "a more modest approach that 
focuses on the particular issue at hand and looks to history for guidance."9 
In particular, the Court criticized the first two prongs of the Lemon test, 
focused on secular purpose and the effect of a law. 10 Scholars such as 
Michael McConnell have similarly sharply critiqued the first two prongs of 
the Lemon test, as "several steps removed from the actual experiences that 
lay behind the [ original] decision to deny the government authority to erect 
or maintain an establishment ofreligion." 11 
Despite these clear criticisms of Lemon's first two prongs, the Court left 
the status of Lemon's third entanglement prong much less clear.12 And the 
Court just relied on entanglement concerns in a case decided this term. 13 It 
thus appears that the entanglement strand of the Lemon analysis remains 
good law to some extent. But in which contexts, and why? Many scholars 
and jurists have argued that the Supreme Court should abandon 
entanglement analysis altogether, describing the test as incoherent, 
nonsensical, empty, and paradoxical. 14 Others have argued that 
9. Id. at 2087 (plurality opinion). 
I 0. Id. (majority opinion) (alleged establishments ofreligion "express many purposes and convey 
many different messages, both secular and religious" (emphasis added)); id. at 2084 (because "time's 
passage imbues a religiously expressive monument, symbol, or practice with ... historical significance, 
removing it may no longer appear neutral, especially to the local community for which it has taken on 
particular meaning"). 
11. Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: 
Establishment a/Religion, 44 WM. & MARYL. REV. 2105, 2205-06 (2003). 
12. See Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2080 (plurality opinion) ("If the Lemon Court thought that its 
test would provide a framework for all future Establishment Clause decisions, its expectation has not 
been met."); see id. at 2081-82; id. at 2087 (plurality opinion) (opting to set aside Lemon by "tak[ing) a 
more modest approach that focuses on the particular issue at hand and looks to history for guidance"); 
id. (citing cases where the Court had "conspicuously ignored Lemon"). 
13. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berm, No. 19-267, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 3547, at *39 
(U.S. July 8, 2020) (noting that allowing courts to decide who qualifies as a co-religionist "would risk 
judicial entanglement in religious issues"). 
14. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 426-30 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("I adhere to ... 
doubts about the entanglement test .... "), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Wallace 
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 109-10 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing the entanglement test); 
Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768-69 (1976) (White, J., concurring in the judgment) 
( describing the entanglement test as "at once both insolubly paradoxical" and a "blurred, indistinct, and 
variable barrier" (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971))); Edward McGlynn Gaffney, 
Jr., Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The Entanglement of the Court in Sloppy History and 
Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 205, 230 (1980); Philip B. Kurland, The Irrelevance of the 
Constitution: The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REV. 3, 
19 (1979) ("The entanglement part of the Court's triad is either empty or nonsensical."); Gary J. Simson, 
The Establishment Clause in the Supreme Court: Rethinking the Court's Approach, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 
905, 933 (1987) (arguing that the entanglement doctrine "should be eliminated"); David E. Steinberg, 
Alternatives to Entanglement, 80 KY. L.J. 691, 692 (1991) ("This Article argues that the Court should 
end its commitment to the entanglement prong, because the Court's entanglement inquiry is not coherent 
and conflicts with established constitutional principles."). 
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entanglement has served as "a blessing in disguise for religious choice and 
diversity."15 
The Supreme Court has insisted that the doctrines governing 
Establishment Clause questions look to the "specific practice[s]" of 
history. 16 The question this Article explores, then, is whether any of the 
Court's entanglement jurisprudence finds support in the historical record 
regarding establishment of religions. Part I of this Article traces the 
evolution of the Court's entanglement jurisprudence and identifies at least 
six categories in which entanglement has taken on unique meaning. Part II 
of this Article untangles which of these applications seems to be more 
grounded in historical evidence about original concerns that led to an 
Establishment Clause and which applications are ahistorical judicial 
creations. It concludes that entanglement analysis fits with the historical 
record in two primary contexts: First, when it has protected religious groups 
from government interference with the autonomy, internal affairs, and 
administration. Second, entanglement analysis finds historical support 
where it prevents government from treating certain religious groups in a 
preferential way, including by granting monopoly power in the performance 
of public functions. While the Court need not continue these lines of cases 
under the label of "entanglement," this Article argues that this jurisprudence 
should remain good law. On the other hand, the Court's entanglement 
precedent is on far shakier historical ground in several contexts, including 
anti-sectarian skepticism of any sort of government aid to religious groups 
(and accompanying monitoring requirements to avoid religious use of 
funds), concerns about political divisiveness when government interacts 
with religious groups, and opposition to government classifications 
necessary to provide religious exemptions. Part III then explores the 
implications of modifying entanglement to conform to a historical approach, 
including how using history as a guide would curtail applications of the law 
that seemingly place the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause in 
tension. 
15. Michael W. McConnell, Religious Participation in Public Programs: Religious Freedom at 
a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 143 (1992). 
16. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565,577 (2014). As of 2006, "76% of the Justices 
who have written at least one Religion Clause opinion have appealed to history [i.e., specific founders 
or the founding era], and every one of the twenty-three Justices who authored more than four Religion 
Clause opinions have done so." Mark David Hall, Jeffersonian Walls and Madisonian lines: The 
Supreme Court ·s Use of History in Religion Clause Cases, 85 OR. L. REV. 563, 572 (2006). 
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF ENTANGLEMENT ANALYSIS 
This Part traces the evolution of the Court's entanglement jurisprudence 
and identifies at least six categories in which entanglement has taken on 
unique meaning: anti-sectarian roots, religious autonomy or interference 
with internal church functions, Lemon's prophylactic entanglement related 
to public support of religion, political entanglement, entanglement with 
public functions, and the Court's meandering entanglement approach to 
religious exemptions. 
A. The Anti-Sectarian Roots of Entanglement 
The legal concept of entanglement has a somewhat dubious pedigree at 
the Supreme Court. Entanglement is now most commonly associated with 
the three-prong Lemon test, created in 1971. 17 But it is the 1948 decision in 
Illinois ex rel. McCollum that marks the Supreme Court's first use of 
"entanglement" as a legal test to assess Establishment Clause violations. 18 
There, the Court struck down an optional program parents could consent to 
which involved release time and religious education for students. 19 The 
education program was offered by a voluntary association, which had been 
formed by "interested members of the Jewish, Roman Catholic, and a few 
of the Protestant faiths. "20 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter asserted the principle that 
"the public school must keep scrupulously free from entanglement in the 
strife of sects."21 In the case before it, the Court found this sort of 
problematic entanglement because "the State's tax-supported public school 
buildings" were being used by the religious program "for the dissemination 
ofreligious doctrines," and the state provided aid to the program in the form 
of the State's "school machinery."22 The Court determined that this was not 
a "separation of Church and State."23 
To justify the position that this public support was problematic, Justice 
Frankfurter stated, "[B]y 1875 the separation of public education from 
Church entanglements, of the State from the teaching of religion, was finnly 
established in the consciousness of the nation."24 Justice Frankfurter then 
17. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
18. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1948); id. at 217 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
19. Id. at 207-12 (majority opinion). 
20. Id. at 207. 
21. Id. at 216--17 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
22. Id. at 212 (majority opinion). 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 217 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
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quoted a speech by President Grant advocating for the federal Blaine 
Amendment, which would have prohibited public funding of "sectarian" 
schools.25 In this speech, President Grant stated, "I predict that the dividing 
line [in our country] will not be Mason and Dixon's, but between patriotism 
and intelligence on the one side and superstition, ambition and ignorance on 
the other."26 This opinion also quoted approvingly President Grant's next 
statement, that "neither the State nor nation, nor both combined, shall 
support institutions of learning other than those sufficient to afford every 
child growing up in the land the opportunity of a good common school 
education, unmixed with sectarian, pagan, or atheistical dogmas."27 Justice 
Frankfurter also noted that "every State admitted into the Union since 1876 
was compelled by Congress to write into its constitution a requirement that 
it maintain a school system 'free from sectarian control. "'28 
Congress ultimately narrowly failed to pass the "Blaine Amendment."29 
But it did pass a law which stated it "to be the settled policy of the 
Government to hereafter make no appropriation whatever for education in 
any sectarian school."30 And it was this same sort of policy that Justice 
Frankfurter was praising in McCollum. 31 This embrace of pro-Blaine 
rhetoric is no longer consistent with the Court's current approach.32 In 2000, 
the Court observed that Blaine amendments "arose at a time of pervasive 
hostility to the Catholic Church and to Catholics in general, and it was an 
open secret that 'sectarian' was code for 'Catholic."'33 The Court described 
Blain Amendments as arising from "a shameful pedigree"34 and a "doctrine, 
born of bigotry. "35 And the Court has since upheld government aid to 
churches,36 including church schools, so long as parents and students had 
private choice in the matter. 37 In its recent Espinoza case, the Court held that 
government is in fact required to provide support for religious schools if it 
25. Id. at 218. 
26. Ulysses S. Grant, U.S. President, President Grant's Des Moines Address (Sept. 29, 1875), in 
3 ANNALS OF IOWA 138, 139 ( 1897). 
27. McCol/um, 333 U.S. at 218 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting The President's Speech at 
Des Moines, 22 CATHOLIC WORLD 433, 434-35 (1876)). 
28. Id. at 220 (quoting Enabling Act of 1889, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676,677). 
29. See, e.g., Steven K. Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 38, 
38 (1992). 
30. Act of June 7, 1897, ch. 3, 30 Stat. 62, 79. 
31. See McCollum, 333 U.S. at 218 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting The President's Speech 
at Des Moines, supra note 27). 
32. See, e.g., Espinoza v. Mont. Dep't of Revenue, No. 18-1195, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 3518, at *24 
(U.S. June 30, 2020) (quoting Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (plurality opinion)). 
33. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 828. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 829. 
36. See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S.Ct. 2012, 2025 (2017). 
37. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639,662 (2002). 
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offers support for private secular schools.38 Yet perhaps unwittingly, the 
Court had, until very recently in its Espinoza decision, continued to 
perpetuate the anti-Sectarian origins of Blaine in an entanglement analysis 
exhibiting skepticism of any public support of religion. 
B. The Pivot to Religious Autonomy 
The Court's entanglement jurisprudence next expanded to include an 
approach focused on protecting the autonomy of the religious organization 
in Walz v. Tax Commission, which rejected an Establishment Clause 
challenge to New York's property tax exemption for church property. 39 The 
majority opinion in Walz held that New York's tax exemption was 
permissible because it recognized "the autonomy and freedom of religious 
bodies," and it "create[ d] only a minimal and remote involvement between 
church and state[,] . . . far less than taxation of churches.',4° So in this 
instance, the Court held that there could be "benevolent neutrality" between 
church and state "without sponsorship and without interference.',4 1 
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Walz took a similar position, but 
he reached his conclusion by emphasizing that the exemption's 
"administration [ would] not entangle government in difficult classifications 
of what is or is not religious," in part because the exemption covered "broad 
and divergent groups. "42 This alternative notion of entanglement was more 
fully developed in Texas Monthly, which involved a Texas sales tax that 
applied to all secular publications, but exempted "[p Jeriodicals that [were] 
published or distributed by a religious faith and that consist[ ed] wholly of 
writings promulgating the teaching of the faith and books that consist[ ed] 
wholly of writings sacred to a religious faith.',43 Justice Brennan's opinion 
noted the entanglement problem inherent in the statute. Specifically, it 
"requires that public officials determine whether some message or activity 
is consistent with 'the teaching of the faith. "'44 Justice Brennan thus 
concluded that although taxing churches would also "enmesh the operations 
of church and state to some degree," enforcing the exemption would 
38. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep't of Revenue, No. 18-1195, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 3518, at *20, *31 (U.S. 
June 30, 2020) ("Montana's no-aid provision discriminates based on religious status .... A State need 
not subsidize private education. But once a State decides to do so, it cannot disqualify some private 
schools solely because they are religious."). 
39. Walz v. Tax Comm'n ofN.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 680 (1970). 
40. Id. at 672, 676. 
41. Id. at 669-70. 
42. Id. at 696--698 (Harlan, J ., concurring). 
43. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 5 (1989) (plurality opinion) (first alteration in 
original) (quoting TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.312 (1982)). 
44. Id. at 20. 
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"produce greater state entanglement with religion than the denial of an 
exemption. ,,4s 
According to Professor Zelinsky, these cases mark the beginning of an 
important distinction in what he calls the Court's "'entanglement' 
moniker."46 In particular, Professor Zelinsky argues that the majority 
opinion in Walz addresses the entanglement problem that results from 
government's "enforcement-related" activities (such as taxes), which affect 
"the internal 'autonomy' of religious institutions.',47 Justice Harlan's 
opinion in Walz and the majority opinion in Texas Monthly focused on the 
entanglement problems at the "borderline" of government action, when 
government must police the boundaries of who qualifies for an exemption 
and who does not.48 
In a somewhat similar posture to these cases dealing with administrative 
entanglement, Justice Brennan also recognized that the religious clauses 
require that "all organs of government [maintain] a strict neutrality toward 
theological questions. "49 More specifically, courts may not inquire into the 
merits of or otherwise weigh the value of or monitor religious organizations' 
doctrines, including prayers,50 sermons,51 doctrine,52 internal 
administration,53 faith, 54 and discipline.55 As the Tenth Circuit explained, 
"Properly understood, the doctrine protects religious institutions from 
governmental monitoring or second-guessing of their religious beliefs and 
45. Id. at 20-21 (emphasis added). 
46. Edward A. Zelinsky, Do Religious Tax Exemptions Entangle in Violation of the 
Establishment Clause? The Constitutionality of the Parsonage Allowance Exclusion and the Religious 
Exemptions of the Individual Health Care Mandate and the FICA and Self-Employment Taxes, 33 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1633, 1641-42 (2012). 
47. Id. at 1641-42. 
48. Id. at 1640-45. 
49. Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,243 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
50. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435 (1962) (striking down mandatory school prayer, 
stating that religion should be left "to the people themselves and to those the people choose to look to 
for religious guidance"). 
51. See Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953) (Jehovah's Witness allowed to conduct 
religious service in public place and government barred from regulating religious sermons). 
52. See Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian 
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 451-52 (1969) (property dispute between two churches beyond scope of courts, 
since civil courts are prohibited from interpreting or weighing church doctrine). 
53. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 502 (1979) (NLRB cannot condemn church 
employment practices, since government review would "involve inquiry into the good faith of the 
position asserted by the clergy-administrators and its relationship to [its] school's religious mission"). 
54. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-88 (I 944) (courts cannot determine truth or 
falsity of belief), rev 'don other grounds, 329 U.S. 187 (1946). 
55. See Serb. E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (I 976) (Court could not 
decide which bishop should lead organization because civil courts are prohibited from delving into 
matters of discipline, faith, internal organization, ecclesiastical rules, custom or law). 
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practices, whether as a condition to receiving benefits (as in Lemon) or as a 
basis for regulation or exclusion from benefits (as here)."56 
One of the cases highlighting this principle doesn't use the word 
entanglement, but describes the principle by other means. In the Watson v. 
Jones case, the Court rejected the English law that gave the state ultimate 
authority over ecclesiastical disputes, in favor of church autonomy over 
"questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law."57 
Later, in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, the Court recognized that 
even the "process of inquiry" by government into religious doctrine or 
sensitive internal affairs could "impinge on rights guaranteed by the 
Religion Clauses."58 Thus, the Court refused to allow the National Labor 
Relations Board even to exercise jurisdiction over lay faculty members at 
two groups of religious high schools, or to order the schools to bargain with 
unions on behalf of teachers. 59 The Court explained that "[t]he key role 
played by teachers in such a school system has been the predicate for our 
conclusions that governmental aid channeled through teachers creates an 
impermissible risk of excessive governmental entanglement in the affairs of 
the church-operated schools."60 The Court further made clear that "[g]ood 
intentions" of government would not "avoid entanglement with the religious 
mission of the school."61 
Widmar v. Vincent is another case that involves elements of both 
doctrinal entanglement and government surveillance and monitoring.62 
There, the Court held that a state university could not bar student groups 
from using university facilities for religious purposes. 63 Furthermore, in 
response to Justice White's argument that the Establishment Clause 
permitted the university to bar use of public facilities for "religious 
worship" but not for "religious speech,"64 the majority held that such a 
distinction would: (1) compel the university "to inquire into the significance 
of words and practices to different religious faiths, and in varying 
56. Colo. Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1261 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Carl H. 
Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental Interference with Religious Organizations, 41 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347, 397 (1984)). 
57. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727 (1872); see also Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the 
Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952) (First Amendment gives religious 
organizations "independence from secular control or manipulation[,] ... power to decide for themselves, 
free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine"). 
58. NLRB, 440 U.S. at 502. 
59. Id. at 506-07. 
60. Id. at 50 I. 
61. Id. at 502. 
62. 454 U.S. 263,267 (1981). 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 284 (White, J., dissenting). 
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circumstances by the same faith,"65 and (2) foster "a continuing need to 
monitor group meetings to ensure compliance with the rule."66 This 
monitoring would have impermissibly entangled the government in the 
religious group's affairs. Thus, in these contexts, the Court was employing 
entanglement to prevent against excessive government monitoring or 
administrative evaluations ofreligious practices, affairs, or doctrines. 
The Court just recently affirmed the relevance of entanglement analysis 
in the context of church autonomy in Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. 
Morrissey-Berru. 67 There, the Court affirmed the ministerial exception 
principle from its 2012 decision in Hosanna-Tabor, which prevents 
government from interfering with the employment relationship between a 
religious organization and a religious leader it selects. But the Court went 
on to clarify in Our Lady that courts should also refrain from deciding 
whether a leader is a "co-religionist," as this would "risk judicial 
entanglement in religious issues."68 Thus, the ministerial exception is a 
protection that is not limited solely to "practicing" members of "the religion 
with which the employer is associated."69 Justices Thomas and Gorsuch 
would have gone further and said that the "broader inquiry whether an 
employee's position is 'ministerial'" should be entirely off limits to the 
courts because of entanglement concems.70 
C. Lemon's Prophylactic Entanglement Related to Public Support 
In 1971, the Lemon v. Kurtzman Court formally established the 
"excessive ... entanglement" inquiry as an official prong of the Court's 
newly minted test.71 In Lemon, the Court determined that state aid for 
religious schools constituted an establishment because the aid was 
conditioned on several entangling regulatory controls.72 In efforts to prevent 
an establishment, one state had imposed a system of "comprehensive, 
discriminating, and continuing state surveillance"73 to ensure that funds 
were not being used for "subject[s] ... [of] religio[n], ... morals or forms 
65. Id. at 269 n.6. 
66. Id. at 272 n.11. 
67. No. 19-267, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 3547 (U.S. July 8, 2020). 
68. Id. at *39. 
69. Id. at *38. 
70. Id. at *43 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
71. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (emphasis added) (quoting Walz v. Tax 
Comm'n ofN.Y., 397 U.S. 664,674 (1970)). 
72. Id. at 616. 
73. Id. at 619. 
2020] UNTANGLING ENTANGLEMENT 1711 
of worship."74 One state's program even specifically targeted Roman 
Catholic schools, and no other religious private schools.75 
On the same day, the Court decided a similar case, but reached a different 
conclusion. 76 In Tilton v. Richardson, the Court upheld the constitutionality 
of a public construction grant for a religiously affiliated college and 
university facilities because such grants did not require surveillance to 
prevent diversion to sectarian use. 77 Indeed, such grants were one-time, 
single-purpose grants that engendered no ongoing church-state monitoring 
and entanglement. 78 These cases highlighted the incorporation of the type 
of monitoring problems discussed above. 
From these early "excessive entanglement" cases, it also appears that the 
Court was beginning to introduce a "prophylactic dimension" into its 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, particularly related to public support 
of religious groups. Relationships between religious organizations and state 
authorities were forbidden not only if they resulted in direct government 
support of religious enterprises, but also if such relationships were 
''pregnant with dangers of excessive government direction" of the 
enterprises as well.79 In some applications this "prophylactic dimension" 
perhaps strengthened the "wall of separation" between church and state. On 
its face, Lemon characterized this "wall" as "a blurred, indistinct, and 
variable barrier. "80 Yet it also described "excessive entanglement" as a 
doctrine that would tend "to corifine rather than enlarge the area of 
permissible state involvement with religious institutions."81 
The high-water mark of this "prophylactic dimension" within the 
excessive entanglement test occurred a few years later, in Meek v. 
Pittenger. 82 In Meek, the State of Pennsylvania passed a law that provided 
all schools with funding for testing services, counseling and health services, 
textbook loans, and other instructional materials.83 In reviewing that law, 
the Court upheld the textbook loan program, 84 but struck down the other 
forms of aid. 85 The Court held that all the programs that gave aid directly to 
religious schools or teachers were unconstitutional, because "[t]he State 
74. Id. at 620-21. 
75. Id. at 615-16. 
76. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 687-88 (1971) (plurality opinion). 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. lemon, 403 U.S. at 620 (emphasis added). 
80. Id. at 614. 
81. Id. ( emphasis added). 
82. 421 U.S. 349 (1975), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
83. Id. at35l-52. 
84. Id. at 352-55. 
85. Id. at 359---62 (plurality opinion). 
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must be certain ... that subsidized teachers do not inculcate religion," and 
yet because "a teacher remains a teacher, ... the danger that religious 
doctrine will become intertwined with secular instruction persists."86 In 
other words, it was unconstitutional for the State to provide religious 
teachers or schools with material "which from its nature can be diverted to 
religious purposes."87 It also was unconstitutional for the State to rely "on 
the good faith and professionalism of the secular teachers and counselors 
functioning in church-related schools to ensure that a strictly nonideological 
posture is maintained. "88 
The Court began to retreat from this particularly restrictive approach to 
entanglement. Only a few years later, the Court in Roemer v. Board of 
Public Works of Maryland held: "There is no exact science in gauging the 
entanglement of church and state. The wording of the test, which speaks of 
'excessive entanglement,' itself makes that clear."89 Further, in RegLtn, the 
Court maintained that it will not inevitably assume "bad faith upon which 
any future excessive entanglement [ c ]ould be predicated. "90 Despite these 
initial criticisms, however, the "excessive entanglement" test continued to 
function as the Court's primary tool to assess whether government 
assistance programs violated the Establishment Clause for several 
decades. 91 
In 1973, the Court struck down a State law that reimbursed religious 
schools for expenses incurred to satisfy the State's testing requirement. 92 In 
that case, the Court feared that such an "inquiry would be irreversibly 
frustrated if the Establishment Clause were read as permitting a State to pay 
for whatever it requires a private school to do."93 In 1977, the Court allowed 
counseling services held at sites away from religious school campuses, 
diagnostic services provided at the religious school campuses, and 
standardized test scoring services provided at nearby public schools. 94 
However, it did not allow religious schools to receive funds for their own 
instructional materials or for field trips.95 According to the Court, the State 
86. Id. at 370-71 (majority opinion) (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619). 
87. Id. at 357 (emphasis added) (quoting Meek v. Pittinger, 374 F. Supp. 639, 662 (E.D. Pa. 
1974)). 
88. Id. at 369. 
89. 426 U.S. 736, 766-67 (1976) (emphasis omitted). 
90. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 660-61 (1980). 
91. I WILLIAM J. RICH, Effects, Entanglement, and Aid to Religious Programs and Activities, in 
MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § I 0: 13 (3d ed. 2017). 
92. Levitt v. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472,482 (1973). 
93. Id.at481-82. 
94. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229,255 (1977), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 
(2000). 
95. Id. 
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could not provide services that could be "diverted to sectarian uses. "96 The 
Court also struck down several other programs in the 1980s, which also 
fostered a "pervasive monitoring by public authorities in the sectarian 
schools," and required "ongoing inspection ... to ensure the absence of a 
religious message."97 
In 1997, however, the Court overruled many of these cases in Agostini v. 
Felton.98 In Agostini, Justice O'Connor wrote that the Court had 
"abandoned the presumption ... that the placement of public employees on 
parochial school grounds inevitably results in the impermissible effect of 
state-sponsored indoctrination or constitutes a symbolic union between 
government and religion."99 This assertion therefore walked back 
applications of the "excessive entanglement" test, especially any 
presumption that "public employees will inculcate religion simply because 
they happen to be in a sectarian environment." 100 Similarly, in Zelman v. 
Simmons-Harris, the Court held that there is no entanglement where a state 
"provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct 
government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own genuine 
and independent private choice."101 
In Lynch v. Donnelly, the Court acknowledged some inconsistencies in 
this type of entanglement application. 102 After being asked to review a 
district court's finding regarding entanglement, 103 the Court decided to "not 
even apply the Lemon 'test'" because it found the "line-drawing process" to 
be too difficult. 104 In addition, Chief Justice Rehnquist later lamented that 
the Court's continued confusion about entanglement had become so 
perplexing, that he wondered "whether the possibility of meeting 
the entanglement test is now anything more than 'a promise to the ear to be 
broken to the hope, a teasing illusion like a munificent bequest in a pauper's 
will.,,, i os 
In its recent Espinoza decision, the Court based its decision requiring 
public support for a religious school on a distinction between religious 
96. Id. at251 n.18. 
97. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 412-13 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 
203 (1997); see also Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 376--77 (1985), overruled by 
Agostini, 521 U.S. 203. 
98. 521 U.S. 203. 
99. Id. at 223 ( emphasis added). 
I 00. Id. at 234. 
IOI. 536 U.S. 639,652 (2002). 
102. 465 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984). 
103. Id. 
I 04. Id. at 679. 
105. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349,394 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment in 
part and dissenting in part) (quoting Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 186 (1941) (Jackson, J., 
concurring)), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
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status and religious use. 106 The Court left open some possibility that 
government might restrict funds that were being put to a religious "use."107 
D. Political Entanglement 
Along with establishing the "excessive entanglement" test, Lemon also 
created "[a] broader base of entanglement of yet a different character" which 
it defined as the "divisive political potential of the[] state programs. " 108 In 
particular, the Lemon Court explained that while most "political debate and 
division, however vigorous or even partisan, are normal and healthy 
manifestations of our democratic system," it held that "political division 
along religious lines was one of the principal evils against which the First 
Amendment was intended to protect."109 
This doctrine took on a life of its own in later cases. For example, in 
Nyquist, the Court held that "competing efforts to gain or maintain the 
support of government" by religious groups had "occasioned considerable 
civil strife," which conflicted with the First Amendment. 11° Furthermore, in 
Meek, the Court held that "the prospect of repeated confrontation" between 
religious teachers and state officials "provide[ d] successive opportunities 
for political fragmentation and division," and the attendant "danger that 
religious doctrine will become intertwined with secular instruction."111 
In Larson v. Valente, the Court applied the political entanglement 
doctrine outside the school aid context. 112 At issue in Larson was a 
Minnesota reporting law which only applied to religious organizations that 
received more than half of their contributions from nonmembers. 113 In 
determining that the reporting requirement was unconstitutional, the Larson 
Court held that "the distinctions drawn by [the Minnesota statute], and its 
fifty per cent rule 'engender a risk of politicizing religion."' 114 The Larson 
· Court did not rely on the political entanglement doctrine outlined in Lemon. 
Rather, it compared the 50 percent statute to the "European legacy" of 
106. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep't of Revenue, No. 18-1195, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 35 I 8, at *16 (U.S. June 
30, 2020) ("The provision plainly excludes schools from government aid solely because of religious 
status."). 
107. Id. at *17-18. The Court did note, however, that "[n]one of this is meant to suggest that we 
agree with the Department, ... that some lesser degree of scrutiny applies to discrimination against 
religious uses of government aid." Id. at * 19 ( citation omitted). 
108. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 ( I 971 ). 
109. Id. 
110. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 796 (1973). 
111. Meek, 421 U.S. at 370,372. 
112. 456 U.S. 228 (1982). 
113. Id. at 231-32. 
114. Id. at 253 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 695 (1970) (Harlan, J., 
concurring)). 
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"excessive government direction . . . of churches" "and evaluation 
of ... religious content," which was expressly condemned within "the 
history and logic of the Establishment Clause."115 
The political entanglement doctrine has received significant pushback, 
however. As early as 1977, members of the Court were already considering 
whether political division even mattered at all: 
At this point in the 20th century we are quite far removed from the 
dangers that prompted the Framers to include the Establishment 
Clause in the Bill of Rights. The risk of significant religious or 
denominational control over our democratic processes---or even of 
deep political division along religious lines-is [therefore] 
remote .... 116 
Later, in Lynch v. Donnelly, the Court also held that the mere fact that a 
city sponsored a nativity scene in a way that would likely result in political 
divisions along religious lines was insufficient to show entanglement. 117 
Indeed, the Court explicitly explained that it has "not held that political 
divisiveness alone can serve to invalidate otherwise permissible 
conduct." 1 1 8 
Despite these rather pointed criticisms, the political entanglement 
doctrine resurfaced in later cases. Justice Breyer's dissent in Zelman 
contains his perspective that the Establishment Clause was created to avoid: 
religious strife, not by providing every religion with an equal 
opportunity (say, to secure state funding or to pray in the public 
schools), but by drawing fairly clear lines of separation between 
church and state-at least where the heartland of religious belief, 
such as primary religious education, is at issue. 119 
Justice Breyer also asserted this opinion in Van Orden v. Perry, where 
he stated that political divisiveness "promotes social conflict, sapping the 
strength of government and religion alike."120 Similarly, in McCreary 
County v. American Civil Liberties Union, Breyer joined an opinion stating 
that the Framers "intended not only to protect the integrity of individual 
115. Id. at 244,246,255 (first aleration in original). 
116. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 263 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part, concurring in 
the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (citation omitted), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 
793 (2000). 
117. 465 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984). 
118. Id. at 684. 
119. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 722-23 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
omitted). 
120. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677,698 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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conscience ... but to guard against the civic divisiveness that follows when 
the government weighs in on one side ofreligious debate."121 
That said, the majority in Zelman opposed Justice Breyer's argm:nents. 
"We quite rightly have rejected the claim that some speculative potential for 
divisiveness bears on the constitutionality of educational aid programs."122 
E. Entanglement with Public Functions 
The Court has also expanded entanglement analysis to include some 
contexts where religious groups have been delegated discretionary 
government authority. For example, in Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., the 
Court held that a State could not delegate authority to churches by allowing 
them to ban liquor licenses from establishments within 500-feet of their 
property. 123 The Court determined that part of the problem was that the 
"churches' power under the statute is standardless," and also that the State 
had impermissibly "substitute[ d] the unilateral and absolute power of a 
church for the reasoned decisionmaking of a public legislative body." 124 The 
Court discussed the "entanglement implications of a statute vesting 
significant governmental authority in churches," and thus "enmesh[ing] 
churches in the exercise of substantial governmental powers."125 The Court 
determined that "few entanglements could be more offensive to the spirit of 
the Constitution."126 
In Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet, the Court similarly 
pointed to the "entangling" problem of delegating important, discretionary 
governmental powers to religious bodies because the state had created a 
separate school district for a village that consisted of members of the Satmar 
Hasidim tradition of Judaism. 127 The purpose of this school district was to 
prevent "the panic, fear and trauma [the children] suffered in leaving their 
own community and being with people whose ways were so different" in 
normal public schools. 128 Although the Court did not treat it as dispositive 
that a religious group had received a benefit, the Court held that the State 
could not "single[] out a particular religious sect for special treatment."129 
Furthermore, according to Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion: "The real 
121. 545 U.S. 844, 876 (2005). 
122. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 662 n.7; see also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S 793, 825 (2000). 
123. 459 U.S. 116 (1982). 
124. Id. at 125, 127. 
125. Id. at 126. 
126. Id. at 127. 
127. Bd. ofEduc. of Kiryas Joel Viii. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 697, 708 (1994). 
128. Id. at 692 (alteration in original) (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Monroe-Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist. 
v. Wieder, 527 N.E.2d 767, 770 (1988)). 
129. Id. at 698, 706. 
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vice of the school district . . . [was] that [ the government] created it by 
drawing political boundaries on the basis of religion."130 
Yet the Supreme Court has not suggested that religious groups or 
individuals can never participate in public functions. In both Marsh v. 
Chambers, 131 and Town of Greece v. Galloway, the Supreme Court 
determined that local governments could permit chaplains to open 
government sessions with prayer. 132 And in Bowen v. Kendrick, 133 the 
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a government program that 
partnered with organizations "that were affiliated with religious 
denominations and that had corporate requirements that the organizations 
abide by religious doctrines" to provide publicly funded social services to 
combat teen pregnancy. 134 The program allowed religious groups to fulfill 
an important function and "expressly contemplated that some of those 
moneys might go to projects involving religious groups."135 The Court also 
rejected the claim "that religious institutions are disabled by the First 
Amendment from participating in publicly sponsored social welfare 
programs,"136 and emphasized that a "symbolic link" between the 
government and the religious organization did not constitute an improper 
entanglement with religion. 137 
F. A Meandering Approach to Religious Exemptions 
In McDaniel v. Paty, Justice Brennan asserted that government 1s 
permitted 
to take religion into account when necessary to further secular 
purposes unrelated to the advancement of religion, and to exempt, 
when possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation 
individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise 
thereby be infringed, or to create without state involvement an 
atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish. 138 
Justice Brennan viewed this as an exception to the principle that 
"government may not use religion as a basis of classification for the 
I 30. Id. at 722 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added). 
131. 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
132. 572 U.S. 565 (2014). 
133. 487 U.S. 589 (1988). 
134. Id. at 599. 
135. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587,607 (2007) (plurality opinion). 
136. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 609. 
137. Id. at 613. 
138. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 639 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(footnotes omitted). 
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imposition of duties, penalties, privileges or benefits."139 This was the first 
clear statement of the accommodation principle in a Supreme Court 
opinion. 140 Government thus need not fear entanglement with religious 
beliefs simply because it removes burdens on religious exercises, even if 
this requires the government to "use religion as a basis of classification" in 
a way it may not do elsewhere. 141 Justice Brennan noted that such "religious 
classifications" were sometimes necessary to "avoid ' [a] manifestation 
of ... hostility [toward religion]"' contrary to the Free Exercise Clause. 142 
The Court later explained that when accommodations are made for religion · 
in general rather than for one sect in particular, "government may (and 
sometimes must) accommodate religious practices and that it may do so 
without violating the Establishment Clause."143 
As notions of entanglement expanded under the Lemon test, the Court 
seemed to walk back from this more protective view of religion. In Estate 
of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., for example, the Court struck down a state law 
requiring employers to accommodate work schedules of their employees. 144 
The Supreme Court noted that the statute required the State Mediation 
Board to decide "which religious activities may be characterized as an 
'observance of Sabbath' in order to assess employees' sincerity."145 The 
Court affirmed the lower court's determination that this sort of inquiry was 
"exactly the type of 'comprehensive, discriminating and continuing state 
surveillance' ... which creates excessive governmental entanglements 
between church and state."146 Similarly, in Wallace v. Jaffree, the Court 
struck down a state law that accommodated school children who may wish 
to engage in a moment of prayer by instituting a daily moment of silence. 147 
Thus, the Lemon test seemed to require courts to take a suspicious view of 
religious accommodations. 
139. Id. 
140. McConnell, supra note 15, at 176-77. 
141. McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 639 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
142. Id (alterations in original) (quoting Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 
211-12 (1948)). 
143. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1987); see also 
Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 
(1987) ("[T]here is ample room for accommodation ofreligion under the Establishment Clause."); Walz 
v. Tax Comm'n ofN.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) (holding that government may "play in the joints 
productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship 
and without interference"). 
144. 472 U.S. 703, 708-10 (1985). 
145. Id. at 708. 
146. Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 464 A.2d 785, 
794 (1983)). 
147. 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
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But the Court seems to have distanced itself again from that temporary 
suspicious posture, returning to a view that religious accommodations do 
not generally pose Establishment Clause problems, entanglement or 
otherwise. 148 In Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, the Court unanimously 
upheld Title VII's provision that exempts religious organizations from 
religious nondiscrimination requirements. 149 The Court explained that the 
exemption does not "impermissibly entangle[] church and state." Rather, it 
effects "a more complete separation of the two."150 In Employment Division 
v. Smith, the Court expressed a favorable view of legislative religious 
exemptions, noting that "a society that believes in the negative protection 
accorded to religious belief can be expected to be solicitous of that value in 
its legislation as well." 151 Accordingly, the Court noted that permissive 
religious exemptions could still be provided consistent with the First 
Amendment through the "political process."152 In Hobby Lobby, the 
Supreme Court addressed the interplay between a religious exemption 
statute called the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the 
Establishment Clause. 153 The Court rejected the position that a religious 
exemption imposing externalities on others would necessarily violate the 
Establishment Clause. 154 And most recently, in Little Sisters of the Poor v. 
Pennsylvania, 155 the Surpeme Court upheld a religious exemption to the 
contraception mandate that the Trump Administration had crafted. Justice 
Alito explained in his concurrence, "[T]here is no basis for an argument-
that the new rule" offering a religious exemption "violates th[ e 
Establishment] Clause." 156 
Thus, with religious exemptions, the Court seems to have ended up in a 
similar position where it began on this issue: assessing religious beliefs to 
lift government burdens placed upon them does not result in an improper 
entanglement or other sort of Establishment Clause violation. 
148. McConnell, supra note 15, at 182. 
149. 483 U.S. 327, 330 (1987). 
150. Id. at 339. 
151. 494 U.S. 872,890 (1990). 
152. Id. 
153. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 729-30 (2014). 
154. Id. at 729 n.37 ("It is certainly true that in applying RFRA 'courts must take adequate account 
of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on non beneficiaries."' But such "consideration 
will often inform the analysis of the Government's compelling interest and the availability of a less 
restrictive means of advancing that interest" under strict scrutiny analysis. (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 
544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005))). 
155. Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, No. 19-431, 2020 U.S. 
LEXIS 3546 (U.S. July 8, 2020). 
156. Id. at *61 n.13 (Alita, J., concurring). 
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IL UNTANGLING THE HISTORICALLY GROUNDED ASPECTS OF 
ENTANGLEMENT 
The Supreme Court continues to insist that the doctrines governing 
Establishment Clause questions are uniquely shaped by "specific 
practice[s]" of history. 157 So if the Court does not throw out its Lemon 
jurisprudence entirely-which seems unlikely-this Part provides some 
preliminary thoughts on which aspects of the Court's entanglement 
jurisprudence seem most defensible on historical grounds that other scholars 
have identified. 
A. Historically-Defensible Applications of Entanglement 
We have a few sparse records of the concept of "entanglement" being 
discussed in a religious context at the founding. For example, John Adams, 
like many other Americans, feared that the Church of England would 
continue to exercise spiritual dominion over the former thirteen colonies 
after the Revolutionary War. 158 In particular, John Adams condemned the 
English tradition of allowing Parliament to "entangle [its] constitution[] 
with spiritual lords," who then subjected adherents of other religious groups 
to "the utmost artifices of bigotry."159 The concept of religious 
"entanglement" was used by other members of the public as well. American 
Protestant pastors, for example, reviled the practice of the Anglican bishops 
who "entangle[d] [themselves] with the affairs of this life" through their 
authority to "intermeddle" in the affairs of all religious sects and to rule over 
"civil matters." 160 Another sermon given during the founding period argued 
that government must not "entangle the small" by binding the consciences 
of men and "prescribing creeds and making acts of conformity."161 These 
early ·clergy were demanding that the government allow them to "stand on 
even ground," as well as to "equally enjoy their religious opinions, ... 
157. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 577 (2014). As of 2006, "76% of the Justices 
who have written at least one Religion Clause opinion have appealed to history [i.e., specific founders 
or the founding era], and every one of the twenty-three Justices who authored more than four Religion 
Clause opinions have done so." Hall, supra note 16, at 572. 
158. Morgan W. Patterson, The Contributions of Baptists to Religious Freedom in America, 73 
REV. & EXPOSITOR 23 (1976). 
159. John Adams, Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America, in 
6 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: WITH A LIFE OF THE 
AUTHOR, NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS 3, 119 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1851). 
160. NOAH WELLES, VINDICATION OF THE VALIDITY AND DIVINE RIGHT OF PRESBYTERIAN 
ORDINATION 138 (T. Collier. ed., 1796). 
161. TIMOTHY DWIGHT, A SERMON PREACHED AT NORTHAMPTON ON THE TWENTY-EIGHTH OF 
NOVEMBER 1781: 0CCAISONED BY THE CAPTURE OF THE BRITISH ARMY UNDER THE COMMAND OF 
EARL CORNWALLIS 17, 31-32 (Nov. 28, 1781). 
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without molestation, or being exposed to fines and forfeitures or to any 
temporal disadvantages."162 Thus, at least these records suggest an idea of 
entanglement linked to government control over religion and intermeddling 
with religious practices and the conscience of individuals. 
These sorts of discussions track some of the hallmarks of an 
establishment that Professor Michael McConnell has identified, including 
government control over church doctrine, governance, and personnel, and 
prohibitions on worship in dissenting churches. 163 In this vein, Professor 
John Witte has explained that establishing Anglicanism in England "led to 
all manner of state controls of the internal affairs of the established 
Church."164 Some of the Court's current entanglement jurisprudence falls 
within these hallmarks. 
For example, the Court's case law cautioning against government 
monitoring or interference with church administration or doctrine helps 
protect the autonomy and religious integrity of institutions. These cases, 
including Walz, 165 Watson v. Jones, 166 NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of 
Chicago, 167 Widmar, 168 and Our Lady of Guadalupe Schoo/169 are consistent 
with a historical approach. Perhaps the reasoning of some of these cases 
could be recast-it is unnecessary, for example, that the Court employ the 
"entanglement" moniker to arrive at these results. But continuing the use of 
entanglement analysis at least in this context would find rich support in 
historical sources. 
The performance of public functions appears to be another area where 
entanglement analysis is historically justified, but this point should not be 
overstated. As I have written elsewhere, 170 historical sources do not reflect 
widespread establishment concerns about churches performing civil 
functions at all. Indeed, some charitable works originally performed by 
churches-like caring for orphans--did not even become civil functions the 
government took on until long after churches had been performing them as 
162. HENRY CUMINGS, A SERMON PREACHED AT BILLERICA DECEMBER 15, 1796, BEING THE 
DAY APPOINTED BY AUTHORITY, TO BE OBSERVED THROUGHOUT THE COMMONWEALTH OF 
MASSACHUSETTS AS A DAY OF PUBLIC PRAISE AND THANKSGIVING 13 (Dec. 15, 1796). 
163. McConnell, supra note 11, at 2131. 
164. JOHN WITTE JR., GOD'S JOUST, GOD'S JUSTICE: LAW AND RELIGION IN THE WESTERN 
TRADlTION 186 (2006). 
165. 397 U.S. 664,680 (1970). 
166. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 727 (1872). 
167. 440 U.S. 490,502 (1979). 
168. 454 U.S. 263,267 (1981). 
169. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, No. 19-267, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 3547 (U.S. 
July 8, 2020). 
170. Stephanie H. Barclay et al., Original Meaning and the Establishment Clause: A Corpus 
Linguistics Analysis, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 505,557 (2019). 
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a ministry. 171 But religious performance of public functions did become 
problematic when the church was given preferential treatment or monopoly 
power over the function. For example, in the early republic, an article in a 
newspaper called the Pennsylvania Journal expressed concern about a law 
that only allowed members of an established church in England to teach in 
schools. The law also prevented parents from sending their children to a 
religious school consistent with the parents' religious beliefs. 172 
Thus, establishment restrictions were created both to disallow 
government's ability "to control and harness religion in service of the 
state,"173 as well as the church's ability to control and harness the state in 
service of one religion. 174 As a result, the Court's entanglement decisions in 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 175 Bowen v. Kendrick, 176 andEspinoza177 seem 
historically sound. These decisions approve government partnerships with 
religious groups to perform public functions so long as beneficiaries have 
various options and real choice in the matter. 178 
B. Dubious Applications of Entanglement 
Other aspects of the Court's entanglement jurisprudence seem much 
further afield from historical justifications. These include the anti-sectarian 
concerns about any sort of public funding to support religion, monitoring 
issues that are problems of the Court's own making, fear of political 
divisiveness, and concerns about religious exemptions. 
To begin with, the Court's rhetoric expressing concern about aid to any 
religious groups (even in an even-handed way) can be traced back to the 
171. Private religious organizations largely developed the adoption and foster care system. See E. 
Wayne Carp, Introduction: A Historical Overview of American Adoption, in ADOPTION IN AMERICA: 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES I, 3-4 (E. Wayne Carp ed., 2002); see also ELLEN HERMAN, KINSHIP BY 
DESIGN: A HISTORY OF ADOPTION IN THE MODERN UNITED STATES 60, 125 (2008); BARBARA MELOSH, 
STRANGERS AND KIN: THE AMERICAN WAY OF ADOPTION 15 (2002); Paula F. Pfeffer, A Historical 
Comparison of Catholic and Jewish Adoption Practices in Chicago, 1833-1933, in ADOPTION IN 
AMERICA: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES,supra, at 101, 103-05. 
172. See The Remonstrant, No. IV, PA. J., Nov. 3, 1768, reprinted in COLLECTION OF TRACTS 
FROM THE LATE NEWS PAPERS, &C. 83, 85 (1769) ("[T]he Toleration Act ... deprived all parents that 
were not of the established Church, of the great trust committed to them by GOD, and nature, to train 
up their own children according to their own sentiments in religion, and the fear of GOD. No catechism 
was to be taught to children, but that of the Church of England, and no man under severe penalties, was 
allowed to teach even an English school, who did not, in all things, conform to that Church. Let our 
Anatomist call this unmerited abuse .... "). 
173. McConnell, supra note 11, at 2208. 
174. Barclay et al., supra note 170, at 557. 
175. 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
176. 487 U.S. 589 (1988). 
\ 177. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep't of Revenue, No. 18-1195, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 3518 (U.S. June 30, 
2020). 
178. Id. at 615-17; Zelman, 536 U.S. at 662-63. 
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Court's first entanglement decision in McCollum, in which it praised 
policies such as Blaine Amendments. 179 Scholars have thoroughly 
canvassed the fact that this concern about any financial support of 
"sectarian" education was linked to a groundswell of nativist opposition to 
any governmental support for the Catholic Church. 180 Massive Catholic 
immigration in the mid- l 800s created friction, and no "area of disagreement 
between Protestants and Catholics caused more friction than the place of 
religion in the public schools." 181 The 1844 "Bible Riots" in Philadelphia 
left more than fifty people dead (and many more injured) and destroyed 
Catholic Churches. 182 In 1859, Boston expelled 400 Catholic students for 
refusing to say the Lord's Prayer. 183 
In its actual application, anti-sectarian didn't really mean no aid for 
religion. As Noah Feldman has explained, "the theorists of the common 
schools thought that the schools must impart some foundational moral 
values to promote civic virtues and believed that those moral values must 
derive in some way from Christian religion."184 "Non-sectarianism, it was 
thought, would . . . enable the state to take a stance in favor of broadly 
shared, foundational Christian values."185 Horace Mann, the leader of the 
common schools movement, argued that common schools "should teach the 
'fundamental principles of Christianity. "'186 A nonsectarian school 
"earnestly inculcates all Christian morals; it founds its morals on the basis 
of religion; it welcomes the religion of the Bible."187 He also stated, "In 
every course of studies, all the practical and preceptive parts of the Gospel 
179. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203,218 n.6 (1948). 
180. PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 193-251 (Harv. Univ. Press 
paperback ed. 2004); Kyle Duncan, Secularism's Laws: State Blaine Amendments and Religious 
Persecution, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 493 (2003); Nathan S. Chapman, Forgotten Federal-Missionary 
Partnerships: New Light on the Establishment Clause (Univ. of Ga. Sch. of Law Research Paper Series, 
Paper No. 2019-34, 2019). 
181. Vincent P. Lannie, Alienation in America: The Immigrant Catholic and Public Education in 
Pre-Civil War America, 32 REV. POL. 503,507 (1970). 
182. Frank S. Ravitch, A Crack in the Wall: Pluralism, Prayer, and Pain in the Public Schools, 
in LAW AND RELIGION: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 296,298 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000); Vincent P. 
Lannie & Bernard C. Diethom, For the Honor and Glory of God: The Philadelphia Bible Riots of 1840, 
8 HIST. EDUC. Q. 44, 75-76 (1968). 
183. STEVEN K. GREEN, THE BIBLE, THE SCHOOL, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE CLASH THAT 
SHAPED MODERN CHURCH-STATE DOCTRINE 40 (2012). Nevada's Blaine Amendment was enacted in 
response to public funding of a Catholic orphanage. A Much Needed Amendment, DAILY NEV. TRIB. 
(Carson City), Feb. 21, 1877 ("[This] is a stepping stone to the final breaking up of a power that has 
long cursed the world, and that is obtaining too much of a foothold in these United States."). 
184. Noah Feldman, Non-Sectarianism Reconsidered, 18 J.L & POL. 65, 67 (2002). 
185. Id. at 66. 
186. GREEN, supra note 183, at 21. 
187. HORACE MANN, TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE BOARD OF 
EDUCATION, in TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF EDUCATION TOGETHER WITH THE 
TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE BOARD 13, 117 (1849). 
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should have been sacredly included; and all dogmatical theology and 
sectarianism sacredly excluded."188 In other words, the historical roots of 
anti-sectarian rhetoric really supported preferential public support for 
certain religious beliefs-precisely the type of preferentialism the 
Establishment Clause was meant to prevent against. 
Furthermore, as I and other scholars have argued elsewhere, the 
historical evidence does not support a conclusion that at the founding period 
any form of public support for religious organizations was viewed as 
equivalent to an establishment of religion. 189 Rather, public support became 
problematic if it involved public support given in a way that preferred 
established churches to other congregations, 190 or resembled a coerced 
church tithe in that it was a special earmarked tax directly given to 
churches. 191 For example, regarding preferential public support, Rhode 
Island Pastor Ezra Stiles in his 1760 discourse at the Convention of the 
Congregational Clergy details that specific financial advantage was given 
exclusively to the established church. He stated, "In Maryland and Virginia 
it is episcopacy [that is established], with appropriations of large revenues 
from tobacco for the established clergy only."192 Similarly, in a 1774 
pamphlet, Thomas Bradbury Chandler stated, 
An established religion, is a religion which the civil authority 
engages, not only to protect, but to support; and a religion that is not 
provided for by the civil authority, but which is left to provide for 
itself, or to subsist on the provision it has already made, can be no 
more than a tolerated religion. 193 
188. HORACE MANN, GO FORTH AND TEACH: AN ORATION DELIVERED BEFORE THE 
AUTHORITIES OF THE ClTY OF BOSTON, JULY 4, 1842 (July 4, 1842), reprinted in GO FORTH AND TEACH: 
AN ORATION DELIVERED BEFORE THE AUTHORITIES OF THE CITY OF BOSTON BY HORACE MANN ALSO 
OTHER MATERIALS RELATING TO HIS LIFE 1, 44-45 (Comm. on the Horace Mann Centennial Nat'J 
Educ. Ass'n 1937). 
189. Barclay et al., supra note 170, at 557. For an excellent discussion of the types of church taxes 
that were concerning during the founding period, as opposed to those that were not, see Mark Storslee, 
Church Taxes and the Original Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 169 U. PENN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2021). 
190. Barclay et al., supra note 170, at 558 ("[O]ur results always involved public support given in 
a way that preferred established churches to other congregations. Sometimes government compounded 
the problem by leveraging that support to try to control church leadership or doctrine of the established 
church."). 
191. Id. at 544, 548-49; see generally Storslee, supra note 189. 
192. EZRA STILES, A DISCOURSE ON THE CHRISTIAN UNION: THE SUBSTANCE OF WHICH WAS 
DELIVERED BEFORE THE REVEREND CONVENTION OF THE CONGREGATIONAL CLERGY 99 (Apr. 23, 
1760). 
193. THOMAS BRADBURY CHANDLER, A FRIENDLY ADDRESS TO ALL REASONABLE AMERICANS, 
ON THE SUBJECT OF OUR POLITICAL CONFUSIONS 55 (N.Y., James Rivington 1774). 
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As for mandatory church tithes, John Murray stated in 1764 that the 
colonies "made an attempt to get themselves eased of the burden of tithes, 
which they could not conscientiously pay, and for refusal of which they 
have so greatly suffered."194 If public support ofreligious groups in general 
was viewed as a problematic hallmark of an establishment, one would 
expect to see more concerns raised about things like tax exemptions or land 
grants. But the opposite is true. 195 
The ahistorical approach the Court has taken to concerns about religious 
groups receiving funds to use for religious purposes gave rise to secondary 
ahistorical issues about entanglement necessary to monitor the use of funds. 
In Lemon itself, the government believed that state aid for religious schools 
must be conditioned on several entangling regulatory controls, including 
"comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance" to 
ensure that funds were not being used for "any subject matter expressing 
religious teaching, or the morals or forms of worship of any sect." 196 Given 
previous precedent expressing concern about public support of religion, the 
government had a reasonable concern that it could not just give money to 
religious schools without strings attached. But then these strings themselves 
became an entanglement problem. 
To be sure, this sort of monitoring is problematic. But it is only needed 
because of anti-sectarian skepticism of giving support to churches even if 
support is even-handed. Chief Justice Rehnquist attacked the illogic of this 
position. "[T]he 'Catch-22' paradox of its own creation," results in a 
situation "whereby aid must be supervised to ensure no entanglement but 
the supervision itself is held to cause an entanglement."197 Were we to 
remove the primary problem, the idea that even-handed public support of 
religious groups is an entanglement, we would avoid the secondary 
monitoring entanglement issue as well. In its recent Espinoza decision, the 
Court based its decision requiring public support for a religious school on a 
distinction between religious status and religious use. 198 The Court left open 
194. 4 JAMES MURRAY, THE HISTORY OF RELIGION: PARTICULARLY OF THE PRINCIPAL 
DENOMINATIONS OF CHRISTIANS 240 (London, C. Henderson et al. 1764); see also Barclay et al., supra 
note 170, at 548-49. 
195. "So ingrained was the practice of land grants for the support of religion that when 
Congress ... organize[d] settlement of the Northwest Territory, its first two substantial grants specified 
that a section in each township would be set apart for the support of religion, along with one for 
education." McConnell, supra note 11, at 2150; see also Chapman, supra note 180. 
196. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619-21 (1971). 
197. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 420--21 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Wallace 
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 109-110 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 
521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
198. Espinoza v. Mont. Dep't of Revenue, No. 18-1195, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 3518, at *16 (U.S. June 
30, 2020) ("The provision plainly excludes schools from government aid solely because of religious 
status."). 
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some possibility that government might restrict funds that were being put to 
a religious "use."199 Notably, if the Court does allow government to 
discriminate against religious use of funds, and thus monitor the use of those 
funds, this may raise some of the entangling concerns that first gave rise to 
Lemon's central holding in the school context. The inability to draw clean 
lines between status and use was a reason Justice Gorusch criticized reliance 
on this distinction.200 But the heightened risk of government entanglement 
may be another reason for the Court to eschew this distinction altogether. 
As to political entanglement, other scholars have argued that there is no 
factual basis for the view that the Framers of the Constitution believed that 
"political division along religious lines was one of the principal evils against 
which the First Amendment was intended to protect."201 This iteration of 
entanglement is famously difficult to apply or predict. Indeed, sometimes 
courts have incorrectly found political divisiveness when it has been caused 
by a lawsuit rather than the religious activity itself.202 
And finally, concerns about entanglement related to government 
provision of religious exemptions similarly are unsupported by the weight 
of the historical evidence. As I have written elsewhere, along with other 
scholars,203 this argument is not a persuasive account of the Supreme 
Court's current Establishment Clause doctrine or the historical 
underpinnings of that provision. Indeed, there are widespread examples of 
exemptions at the Founding, including for Quakers from the draft or other 
groups from oaths.204 And there is no evidence that these exemptions were 
199. Id. at * 17-18. The Court did note, however, that "[ n Jone of this is meant to suggest that we 
agree with the Department, ... that some lesser degree of scrutiny applies to discrimination against 
religious uses of government aid." Id. at * 19 ( citation omitted). 
200. Id. at *58-64 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
201. Leman, 403 U.S. at 622; see, e.g., Gaffney, supra note 14. For an in-depth analysis of why 
political divisiveness should not inform the interpretation of the Establishment Clause, see Richard W. 
Garnett, Religion, Division, and the First Amendment, 94 GEO. L.J. 1667 (2006). 
202. Stephanie Barclay, Note, Passive Acknowledgement or Active Promotion of Religion? 
Neutrality and the Ten Commandments in Green v. Haskell, 2010 BYU L. REV. 3, 13-15. 
203. See, e.g., Stephanie Barclay, First Amendment "Harms," 95 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2020); 
Thomas C. Berg, Religious Accommodation and the Welfare State, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 103 (2015); 
Marc 0. DeGirolami, Free Exercise by Moonlight, 53 SAN DlEGO L. REV. 105 (2016); Carl H. Esbeck, 
When Religious Exemptions Cause Third-Party Harms: Is the Establishment Clause Violated?, 59 J. 
CHURCH & ST. 357 (2016); Richard W. Garnett, Accommodation, Establishment, and Freedom of 
Religion, 67 V AND. L. REV. EN BANC 39, 45 (2014); Christopher C. Lund, Religious Exemptions, Third-
Party Harms, and the Establishment Clause, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1375, 1383-84 (2016); Mark 
Storslee, Religious Accommodation, the Establishment Clause, and Third-Party Harm, 86 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 871 (2019); Marc DeGirolami, Holt v. Hobbs and the Third-Party-Harm Establishment Clause 
Theory, MIRROR JUST. (Oct. 7, 2014), http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2014/l 0/where-
has-the-establishment-clause-third-party-harm-argument-gone.html [https://perma.ccfX7SH-NBHP]. 
204. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of 
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1467-73 (1990); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism 
and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1990). 
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viewed as tantamount to an establishment of religion. Thus, though the 
Supreme Court took a detour away from historical evidence when it decided 
cases such as Caldor, its current jurisprudence about exemptions seems to 
have returned to an approach consistent with the historical evidence. 
III. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
In its recent American Legion decision, the Supreme Court strongly 
suggested that the three-prong Lemon test is essentially dead letter. If one is 
using a historical approach for the Establishment Clause, then disregarding 
the first two prongs of the Lemon test certainly makes sense. Many scholars 
have observed that these aspects of the test appear to have been created 
whole cloth by a judiciary unconcerned with historical origins of the 
Establishment Clause. But what of the entanglement prong of the test? This 
Article cautions that rejecting all applications of entanglement analysis, 
would risk throwing the baby out with the bathwater. 
A close analysis of the Court's entanglement jurisprudence, compared 
against historical support for the various applications, suggests that 
entanglement jurisprudence ought to remain good law in at least two 
contexts. First, where it has protected religious groups from government 
interference with the autonomy, internal affairs, and administration. Second, 
where it prevents government from treating certain religious groups in a 
preferential way, including by granting monopoly power in the performance 
of public functions. These lines of cases find more historical support for the 
types of government actions the Establishment Clause was ratified to protect 
against. While the Court need not continue to root this form of analysis 
under an "entanglement" label, this jurisprudence should remain good law. 
On the other hand, the Court's entanglement precedent is on far shakier 
historical ground in several contexts, including anti-sectarian skepticism of 
any sort of government aid to religious groups ( and accompanying 
monitoring requirements to avoid_ religious use of funds), concerns about 
political divisiveness when government interacts with religious groups, and 
opposition to government classifications necessary to provide religious 
exemptions. 
If the Court were to modify its entanglement analysis to disregard 
ahistorical applications and embrace the historical ones, the upshot is this: 
Many ways in which the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause 
have seemed to be in tension would fade away. Instead, both Religion 
Clauses would work together harmoniously to prevent problematic 
government interference with religious groups or preferential treatment of 
some religions, while still allowing government to even-handedly partner 
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with and support religious groups. Such an interpretation could facilitate an 
increase in religious pluralism and human flourishing and a decrease in 
unnecessary cultural fights aimed at excluding religion from the public 
sphere. 
